Tuesday, April 12, 2011

China's Need for Naval Army

Article: Lee Jae-Hyung, "China's Expanding Maritime Ambitions in the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean", Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol.24, no.3, Dec 2002.

Though this article is somewhat outdated, it nevertheless sheds light on the basic imperatives for China to strengthen its military base in order to complement economic growth with adequate security.

(1) The article stresses the fact that "Beijing has recognized the importance of sea-lines of communication from the Persian Gulf to China, as it became a net oil importer in 1993"

- hence, there has been an almost existential incentive for China to expand its military capabilities, especially the naval force. With China's exponential economic performance, there is every reason to believe that the simultaneous militarization of international waters will continue.

(2) The South China Sea sea lanes are vital for the Chinese as exercising control over this area speaks directly to safeguarding imports of oil from the Persian gulf.

- it seems imperative for the Chinese to first ensure that the waters closest to the China mainland will be controlled by the Chinese navy. In addition, a heightened presence of China in the South China Sea could enable Beijing to get more leverage over Taiwain, which remains protected by the U.S.

(3) By going further west, China embarked on securing support of major regional players, such as Myanmar and Pakistan, partly to maintain balance of power vis-a-vis India. The two countries share favorable relations with Beijing, the latter acting as a welcome alternative to the perceived regional hegemony of the U.S.

- in this respect, is this a worrying sign for the international community given China's poor democratic and human rights record? Or, is it that neither the U.S. nor China have done anything meaningful to support democracy in the region and, hence, the fact that China is increasingly asserting itself should not be too alarming?

(4) The author also touches upon China's currying favor with Iran. As he asserts, "Iran seeks to enhance its political and military influence over the Middle East and to reduce interference form foreign powers, especially the United States, in the Persian Gulf region."

Furthermore, he stresses that "China anticipates that its close ties with Iran would guarantee its growing requirement for oil from the Middle East, and help to restrain radical Islam in China’s western provinces. Iran is viewed as a potential counterbalance to U.S. influence in the Persian Gulf; and China also views Iran as a market for its military hardware."

- Iran's present-day hostility toward the West in general, and the U.S. in particular, points to a likely continuation of this policy from the Chinese side. But to what extent can the U.S. pressure Beijing to give up on its growing engagement in the region, considering the fact that the U.S. is still straight-jacketed by the lingering economic recession and, on the contrary, China is enjoying a positive balance of trade and a steady growth?

- Overall, the intent of Beijing to gradually build its military base can undoubtedly be detected. By conceiving of itself as a superpower equal to the U.S., this military build-up should also be viewed as an attempt to challenge the U.S. military (and esp. naval) supremacy.

- As a next step, it could be perhaps useful to take a look at China's military involvement in the Middle East and what reactions has it elicited from the side of the U.S.

1 comment:

  1. I wonder if China's still faces the problem of lack of Navy being that this article was 9 years ago, I'm sure that in some ways it is still the case. Also as I noted above in regards to Iran, China is still feeling the friction from dealing with Iran. I wonder if we should look into other potential points of friction with China and oil imports from other countries in relation to the U.S. if such exist.

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