Rejoinder to Ross' Piece

In response to Robert Ross' article I published earlier, two scholars, M.A.Glosny and P.C.Saunders provide a rejoinder:

This came out in International Security journal, Fall 2010 ("Debating China's Naval Nationalism")

Overall, though still seeing the world through the all-encompassing lens of China's thrust to address its national-security concerns (which is probably a very fair and true depiction given that the world of IR is still driven by the imperatives of sovereign interests), the article explains China's inclination to develop greater sea power from a different angle.

First, it dismisses Ross' geopolitical analysis and rather claims that, for China, the "security environment" has changed. Today, the Chinese are concerned about developing "confidence-building measures", "strategic partnerships" and "regional organizations". As it stand now, China is very far from attempting to challenge the U.S. in its maritime power dominance.

The Chinese are aware of the fact that they cannot complete with the U.S. militarily. And, indeed, they do not even want to. They priorities are tangled to preserving its own global interests which, as the two authors argue, have been taken by the Chinese leadership as a need to focus its activities on projecting a "limited naval power" whereby interests of other states would not be compromised.

In other words, there has been a shift from focusing on national security to "regime security" which has worked as a reflection of the intertwined nature of global economy and multilateral politics.

The authors also criticize Ross' over-emphasis on "Chinese nationalism" as a driving force behind the country's ostensible thrust toward projecting massive naval power for the purpose of boosting military capabilities. The two authors argue that the extent to which Chinese nationalism influences decision-making is difficult to tell, partly because there is a considerable lack of transparency when it comes to China's domestic affairs. In addition, since past waves of nationalism inside China did not translate into adoption of aggressive policies, there is little evidence to suggest that the current plans to build new sea carriers have roots in an increased public demand to increase the country's prestige abroad.

I personally think it is important here to notice how things that appear daunting on the surface (China building a new aircraft carriers in order to boost international prestige and assume desirable naval strength) should be viewed through a more nuanced lens (China building these carriers for other than military purposes, such as international peacekeeping, humanitarian missions..etc.).

China might be aware of the potential for its regime to fall as a result of the continuous opening of its economy. That's why, it may be plausible to argue that greater efforts aimed at ameliorating the regime's image on the international scene through showing a good-will have been pursued by the Chinese leadership.

I think it can ben only through Chinese people's increasing exposure to the outside world that the regime inside the country can gradually turn more democratic. On the other hand, I think one has to contend that while Chinese government retains its capability to raise living standards through formidable economic performance, the arguments for a complete democratization (in whatever such a vague term may mean) should be carefully analyzed and thought through.