In response to Robert Ross' article I published earlier, two scholars, M.A.Glosny and P.C.Saunders provide a rejoinder:
This came out in International Security journal, Fall 2010 ("Debating China's Naval Nationalism")
Overall, though still seeing the world through the all-encompassing lens of China's thrust to address its national-security concerns (which is probably a very fair and true depiction given that the world of IR is still driven by the imperatives of sovereign interests), the article explains China's inclination to develop greater sea power from a different angle.
First, it dismisses Ross' geopolitical analysis and rather claims that, for China, the "security environment" has changed. Today, the Chinese are concerned about developing "confidence-building measures", "strategic partnerships" and "regional organizations". As it stand now, China is very far from attempting to challenge the U.S. in its maritime power dominance.
The Chinese are aware of the fact that they cannot complete with the U.S. militarily. And, indeed, they do not even want to. They priorities are tangled to preserving its own global interests which, as the two authors argue, have been taken by the Chinese leadership as a need to focus its activities on projecting a "limited naval power" whereby interests of other states would not be compromised.
In other words, there has been a shift from focusing on national security to "regime security" which has worked as a reflection of the intertwined nature of global economy and multilateral politics.
The authors also criticize Ross' over-emphasis on "Chinese nationalism" as a driving force behind the country's ostensible thrust toward projecting massive naval power for the purpose of boosting military capabilities. The two authors argue that the extent to which Chinese nationalism influences decision-making is difficult to tell, partly because there is a considerable lack of transparency when it comes to China's domestic affairs. In addition, since past waves of nationalism inside China did not translate into adoption of aggressive policies, there is little evidence to suggest that the current plans to build new sea carriers have roots in an increased public demand to increase the country's prestige abroad.
I personally think it is important here to notice how things that appear daunting on the surface (China building a new aircraft carriers in order to boost international prestige and assume desirable naval strength) should be viewed through a more nuanced lens (China building these carriers for other than military purposes, such as international peacekeeping, humanitarian missions..etc.).
China might be aware of the potential for its regime to fall as a result of the continuous opening of its economy. That's why, it may be plausible to argue that greater efforts aimed at ameliorating the regime's image on the international scene through showing a good-will have been pursued by the Chinese leadership.
I think it can ben only through Chinese people's increasing exposure to the outside world that the regime inside the country can gradually turn more democratic. On the other hand, I think one has to contend that while Chinese government retains its capability to raise living standards through formidable economic performance, the arguments for a complete democratization (in whatever such a vague term may mean) should be carefully analyzed and thought through.
Showing posts with label naval nationalism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label naval nationalism. Show all posts
Tuesday, May 3, 2011
Tuesday, April 26, 2011
A little bit of realpolitik
Article: Robert S. Ross, "China's Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response", International Security, Fall 2009.
This is a classic mainstream text holding the worldview of a global race for geopolitical supremacy between the U.S. and China. It reminded me a lot of the vast majority of articles contained in the FP magazine that we can pick up every week at GPIA office :)
The author proposes a thesis whereby the chief point of concern is China's alleged spiking military build-up, especially in the area of naval security. He identifies that as a growing concern for the U.S. national security and its position as a power hegemon in Pacific blue-waters.
Ross claims that in light of China's alleged desire to attain a great power status similar to the U.S., its leadership has decided to invest heavily into the nation's naval forces. This, in turn, might pose some threat to the established security interests of the U.S. (which are portrayed as vital not only in terms of the U.S. national security, but also from the viewpoint of providing security to U.S. main partners in the region, such as Japan or Singapore). In this regard, China is depicted as an unwelcome challenge.
According to Ross, this thrust for the attainment of greatness is further complemented by China's "pseudo-national interest strategy". Indeed, this is the main thread throughout the whole article as the Chinese leadership, however rational and relatively non-aggresive in terms of geopolitical agenda, has been ostensibly captured by China's nationalists who seek increased militarization to fulfill aspirations of the Chinese people.
In Ross' view, this kind of nationalism is wholly irrational and undermines China's long-lasting strategy of power projection via peaceful diplomatic means. This approach has, for decades, helped China attain its current economic growth and, at the same time, left unchallenged the U.S. naval supremacy in the Pacific. Since the author clearly associates himself with the view that, in order for world's peace and stability, we need the U.S. to singularly take on the protection of blue-seas and maintain its status as a chief guarantor of international security, he obviously dismisses this avowed Chinese nationalism. But by supposedly acknowledging its dominant position within the society (a point I found lacking credible evidence), Ross makes several alarming points with possible consequences for the U.S. should this whole nationalistic wave let loose.
However, he concludes by appeasing everybody that China is still lagging far behind the U.S.'s naval capabilities. According to him, some of the most crucial short-term implications are possible distortions in the U.S.-China diplomatic relations which, as he stresses, should desirably be kept friendly. Chinese nationalists should regain their sanity, strip their overly ambitious plans and stop investing heavily into navy.
By and large, this is an interesting piece. Not for the originality of argument, but rather for the chance to see the lines along which U.S. mainstream analysts write. There is a critical rejoinder to this published in the same magazine few months later. I will read it soon and then provide a summary. In this way, we can set ourselves a stage for a sound analytical framework.
This is a classic mainstream text holding the worldview of a global race for geopolitical supremacy between the U.S. and China. It reminded me a lot of the vast majority of articles contained in the FP magazine that we can pick up every week at GPIA office :)
The author proposes a thesis whereby the chief point of concern is China's alleged spiking military build-up, especially in the area of naval security. He identifies that as a growing concern for the U.S. national security and its position as a power hegemon in Pacific blue-waters.
Ross claims that in light of China's alleged desire to attain a great power status similar to the U.S., its leadership has decided to invest heavily into the nation's naval forces. This, in turn, might pose some threat to the established security interests of the U.S. (which are portrayed as vital not only in terms of the U.S. national security, but also from the viewpoint of providing security to U.S. main partners in the region, such as Japan or Singapore). In this regard, China is depicted as an unwelcome challenge.
According to Ross, this thrust for the attainment of greatness is further complemented by China's "pseudo-national interest strategy". Indeed, this is the main thread throughout the whole article as the Chinese leadership, however rational and relatively non-aggresive in terms of geopolitical agenda, has been ostensibly captured by China's nationalists who seek increased militarization to fulfill aspirations of the Chinese people.
In Ross' view, this kind of nationalism is wholly irrational and undermines China's long-lasting strategy of power projection via peaceful diplomatic means. This approach has, for decades, helped China attain its current economic growth and, at the same time, left unchallenged the U.S. naval supremacy in the Pacific. Since the author clearly associates himself with the view that, in order for world's peace and stability, we need the U.S. to singularly take on the protection of blue-seas and maintain its status as a chief guarantor of international security, he obviously dismisses this avowed Chinese nationalism. But by supposedly acknowledging its dominant position within the society (a point I found lacking credible evidence), Ross makes several alarming points with possible consequences for the U.S. should this whole nationalistic wave let loose.
However, he concludes by appeasing everybody that China is still lagging far behind the U.S.'s naval capabilities. According to him, some of the most crucial short-term implications are possible distortions in the U.S.-China diplomatic relations which, as he stresses, should desirably be kept friendly. Chinese nationalists should regain their sanity, strip their overly ambitious plans and stop investing heavily into navy.
By and large, this is an interesting piece. Not for the originality of argument, but rather for the chance to see the lines along which U.S. mainstream analysts write. There is a critical rejoinder to this published in the same magazine few months later. I will read it soon and then provide a summary. In this way, we can set ourselves a stage for a sound analytical framework.
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