Article: Robert S. Ross, "China's Naval Nationalism: Sources, Prospects, and the U.S. Response", International Security, Fall 2009.
This is a classic mainstream text holding the worldview of a global race for geopolitical supremacy between the U.S. and China. It reminded me a lot of the vast majority of articles contained in the FP magazine that we can pick up every week at GPIA office :)
The author proposes a thesis whereby the chief point of concern is China's alleged spiking military build-up, especially in the area of naval security. He identifies that as a growing concern for the U.S. national security and its position as a power hegemon in Pacific blue-waters.
Ross claims that in light of China's alleged desire to attain a great power status similar to the U.S., its leadership has decided to invest heavily into the nation's naval forces. This, in turn, might pose some threat to the established security interests of the U.S. (which are portrayed as vital not only in terms of the U.S. national security, but also from the viewpoint of providing security to U.S. main partners in the region, such as Japan or Singapore). In this regard, China is depicted as an unwelcome challenge.
According to Ross, this thrust for the attainment of greatness is further complemented by China's "pseudo-national interest strategy". Indeed, this is the main thread throughout the whole article as the Chinese leadership, however rational and relatively non-aggresive in terms of geopolitical agenda, has been ostensibly captured by China's nationalists who seek increased militarization to fulfill aspirations of the Chinese people.
In Ross' view, this kind of nationalism is wholly irrational and undermines China's long-lasting strategy of power projection via peaceful diplomatic means. This approach has, for decades, helped China attain its current economic growth and, at the same time, left unchallenged the U.S. naval supremacy in the Pacific. Since the author clearly associates himself with the view that, in order for world's peace and stability, we need the U.S. to singularly take on the protection of blue-seas and maintain its status as a chief guarantor of international security, he obviously dismisses this avowed Chinese nationalism. But by supposedly acknowledging its dominant position within the society (a point I found lacking credible evidence), Ross makes several alarming points with possible consequences for the U.S. should this whole nationalistic wave let loose.
However, he concludes by appeasing everybody that China is still lagging far behind the U.S.'s naval capabilities. According to him, some of the most crucial short-term implications are possible distortions in the U.S.-China diplomatic relations which, as he stresses, should desirably be kept friendly. Chinese nationalists should regain their sanity, strip their overly ambitious plans and stop investing heavily into navy.
By and large, this is an interesting piece. Not for the originality of argument, but rather for the chance to see the lines along which U.S. mainstream analysts write. There is a critical rejoinder to this published in the same magazine few months later. I will read it soon and then provide a summary. In this way, we can set ourselves a stage for a sound analytical framework.
Tuesday, April 26, 2011
'No-Strings' Attached
In a piece by Paul French and Sam Chambers, entitled "Oil on Water", the two authors reveal interesting info about China's oil hungry no strings investment in the emerging African oil industry.
As we know, the Chinese government has been very liberal in offering credit and aid on generous terms to oil-producing African nations. China now sources 25-30 percent of its oil imports from Africa, and in 2009, China took 30 % of Angola's total oil exports and 60% of Sudan's output.
China has courted over US$20 billion of aid to African oil nations, and Angola briefly overtook Saudi Arabia as China's major oil supplier. China's oil refining industry is mostly geared to handle sweet crude, which favors African oil over Saudi Arabian's mixture of sweet and crude.
Critics claim that China has unfairly used diplomatic leverage, ignored corruption and conflicts, and done nothing to encourage transparency in the industry, and done little to create jobs in the countries with which it invests. Beijing counters that Americans take more oil from Africa than China does, and through imperialism and business.
As we know, the Chinese government has been very liberal in offering credit and aid on generous terms to oil-producing African nations. China now sources 25-30 percent of its oil imports from Africa, and in 2009, China took 30 % of Angola's total oil exports and 60% of Sudan's output.
China has courted over US$20 billion of aid to African oil nations, and Angola briefly overtook Saudi Arabia as China's major oil supplier. China's oil refining industry is mostly geared to handle sweet crude, which favors African oil over Saudi Arabian's mixture of sweet and crude.
Critics claim that China has unfairly used diplomatic leverage, ignored corruption and conflicts, and done nothing to encourage transparency in the industry, and done little to create jobs in the countries with which it invests. Beijing counters that Americans take more oil from Africa than China does, and through imperialism and business.
Friday, April 22, 2011
Oil Wars: China's Influence on the U.S. Economy pt. 1 of 5
Check out this youtube video on China, it's great
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cNnsyuLQ08g&feature=related
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cNnsyuLQ08g&feature=related
Wednesday, April 20, 2011
Summary of Feeding the dragon: the relentless drive by Chinese energy companies to buy ovrseas oil and gas assets is likely to be constrained by forei
http://find.galegroup.com/gtx/infomark.do?&contentSet=IAC-Documents&type=retrieve&tabID=T003&prodId=ITOF&docId=A140095722&source=gale&srcprod=ITOF&userGroupName=nysl_me_newsch&version=1.0
Feeding the dragon: the relentless drive by Chinese energy companies to buy ovrseas oil and gas assets is likely to be constrained by foreign politics.(China).
Petroleum Economist 72.12 (Dec 2005): p10(2). (1302 words)
In lou of China's go-abroad policy, the country has began to lax many of it's policies such as "loosening its control over the mergers and acquisitions (M&A)" which will help China to procure oil more easily abroad. According to the article the rush overseas "is part of a wider, explicit government strategy". Deals were signed in Australia, Myanmar and Indonesia; and Sinochem by China's National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). According to the article "the crowning glory was CNPC's successful $4.4bn acquisition of PetroKazakhstan, which gives the Chinese firm proved and probable reserves of 0.55bn barrels of oil equivalent at roughly $7.60 a barrel and, importantly, the chance to pump oil from fields direct to China through an under-construction 1,000 km pipeline." In 2004 the company "singed 48 contracts with 20 countries" and "over the next 15 years plans to spend a total of $18bn on oversees acquisitions and stakes. One key advantage to China's go-abroad policy is the fact that China does not adhere to restrictions set by other countries namely the United States and what countries it can do business with. As a result China has a history of making deals with corrupt regimes such as Uzbekistan, Myanmar and Sudan. For China the bottom line is business.Su
Feeding the dragon: the relentless drive by Chinese energy companies to buy ovrseas oil and gas assets is likely to be constrained by foreign politics.(China).
Petroleum Economist 72.12 (Dec 2005): p10(2). (1302 words)
In lou of China's go-abroad policy, the country has began to lax many of it's policies such as "loosening its control over the mergers and acquisitions (M&A)" which will help China to procure oil more easily abroad. According to the article the rush overseas "is part of a wider, explicit government strategy". Deals were signed in Australia, Myanmar and Indonesia; and Sinochem by China's National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). According to the article "the crowning glory was CNPC's successful $4.4bn acquisition of PetroKazakhstan, which gives the Chinese firm proved and probable reserves of 0.55bn barrels of oil equivalent at roughly $7.60 a barrel and, importantly, the chance to pump oil from fields direct to China through an under-construction 1,000 km pipeline." In 2004 the company "singed 48 contracts with 20 countries" and "over the next 15 years plans to spend a total of $18bn on oversees acquisitions and stakes. One key advantage to China's go-abroad policy is the fact that China does not adhere to restrictions set by other countries namely the United States and what countries it can do business with. As a result China has a history of making deals with corrupt regimes such as Uzbekistan, Myanmar and Sudan. For China the bottom line is business.Su
China's "Peaceful Oil Diplomacy"
Article: Hongyi Harry Lai, "China's Oil Diplomacy: Is It a Global Security Threat?" Third World Quarterly 28.3 (2007)
This article examines China's expansion into the Middle East in terms of increasing oil imports, and whether or not this represents a threat the U.S. national security by virtue of tapping into the U.S.'s source of energy resources.
The author argues that these fears have been largely exaggerated. He supports this by mentioning China's support for the U.S. actions vis-a-vis Iraq (voted in favor of UN SC Res. 1441/2002) or the still limited capacity of China's maritime forces whose main preoccupation remains covering of the Taiwan Strait in South China Sea. The Chinese ability to control the oil sea lanes to/from the Persian Gulf is thus very limited. With this in mind, China depends on help from other countries, including the U.S.
Also, in light of the fact that the U.S. oil imports from Arab OPEC nations only accounted for 14.8% in 2005 (I will have to check the latest data on this), the proposed challenge to the U.S. national security does not seem like an urgent matter.
Lastly, China's "peaceful oil diplomacy" has been underlined by the fact that, in 2004, China's domestic energy consumption was still largely based on coal (67.7%); oil accounted for 22.7%. As the study argues, thus, "imported oil plays only a minor role in China's energy consumption". With regards to oil imports from Iran, to mention some of the growing worries amongst the Americans who perceive China's friendly ties with Iran as a reason for caution, the Middle Eastern country supplied only 1% of China's total energy consumption in 2003. On top of all that, it is argued that China has been aware of the growing concerns pertaining to its rapid global expansion and growing energy needs and, thus, so far restrained from any actions that might threaten mutual relations with the U.S.
With this in mind, my personal comment would be that China's speedy development and a heightened thirst for oil are likely going to be based increasingly on oil as a vehicle for growth and urbanization. Hence, with oil expected to be gradually replacing coal in its importance as a core resource, one might expect that China could place more emphasis on securing oil imports from the Middle East in the future. This, in turn, could potentially re-shape the hitherto maintained balance of power and regional/global security framework.
This article examines China's expansion into the Middle East in terms of increasing oil imports, and whether or not this represents a threat the U.S. national security by virtue of tapping into the U.S.'s source of energy resources.
The author argues that these fears have been largely exaggerated. He supports this by mentioning China's support for the U.S. actions vis-a-vis Iraq (voted in favor of UN SC Res. 1441/2002) or the still limited capacity of China's maritime forces whose main preoccupation remains covering of the Taiwan Strait in South China Sea. The Chinese ability to control the oil sea lanes to/from the Persian Gulf is thus very limited. With this in mind, China depends on help from other countries, including the U.S.
Also, in light of the fact that the U.S. oil imports from Arab OPEC nations only accounted for 14.8% in 2005 (I will have to check the latest data on this), the proposed challenge to the U.S. national security does not seem like an urgent matter.
Lastly, China's "peaceful oil diplomacy" has been underlined by the fact that, in 2004, China's domestic energy consumption was still largely based on coal (67.7%); oil accounted for 22.7%. As the study argues, thus, "imported oil plays only a minor role in China's energy consumption". With regards to oil imports from Iran, to mention some of the growing worries amongst the Americans who perceive China's friendly ties with Iran as a reason for caution, the Middle Eastern country supplied only 1% of China's total energy consumption in 2003. On top of all that, it is argued that China has been aware of the growing concerns pertaining to its rapid global expansion and growing energy needs and, thus, so far restrained from any actions that might threaten mutual relations with the U.S.
With this in mind, my personal comment would be that China's speedy development and a heightened thirst for oil are likely going to be based increasingly on oil as a vehicle for growth and urbanization. Hence, with oil expected to be gradually replacing coal in its importance as a core resource, one might expect that China could place more emphasis on securing oil imports from the Middle East in the future. This, in turn, could potentially re-shape the hitherto maintained balance of power and regional/global security framework.
Monday, April 18, 2011
Concrete Project Outline?
I think we really need to come up with some tangible plan or ideas of how to proceed with this project.
(1) What will be the topic of the project? It does not suffice to limit our analysis to where China gets its oil from or what its future energy requirements will be.
- we should choose a specific aspect of this very broad topic so that we can better focus our research. Personally, I think there are two good ways we can approach it:
(a) Focus on China's oil policies towards a specific region (Africa, Middle East) and how this changes hitherto maintained balance of power there. Alternatively, what are the positive (greater development aid for the region..etc.) and negative (environmental degradation, propping up undemocratic governments..etc.) implications of China's growing involvement in that particular region.
(b) China's "oil expansion" into the Middle East and its potential consequences in terms of contending security concerns of other major powers there (the U.S. in particular). Can China's growing share on the Middle Eastern oil markets precipitate conflict? Is China speeding up the expansion of its maritime forces in order to better safeguard its oil imports (and, thereby, challenging the post-WWII U.S. hegemony in this area)?
- Let's talk about this. If anyone has a different view on how we should proceed, we can debate it.
(2) What is the outline and who's going to work on which part?
- obviously, without resolving the first point, there is no way of coming up with an outline. However, based on the blog posts made so far and our general interests, I propose the following:
TOPIC: CHINA OIL AFFAIRS: THE SHIFTING BALANCE OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
I. Introduction
II. China's Booming Economy: Past Precedents and Future Needs
(a) The Flawed Policy of Self-Reliance
(b) China's Economy Today: Growing Oil Demands, World Markets and Increased Foreign Involvement
III. The Security Framework in the Middle East
(a) The U.S. as a Traditional Provider of Security in the Middle East
(b) China's Increasing Share on the Persian Gulf Oil Market - A Threat to the U.S. Interests and Regional Security?
IV. The Security Framework in North Africa
(a) The Oil Markets in Sudan, Libya and Other Oil-Exporting Countries in the Region
(b) The Role of China: Oil Interests and the Changing Security Situation
V. Is China's Involvement in the Middle East and North Africa a Reason for Concern?
(a) How Is China's Economic Outreach Tied to a Greater Militarization of the Region? Or, Is It?
(b) U.S. Take on China's Increasingly Felt Presence in the Region
- in this paragraph, we could analyze countries like S. Arabia, Kuwait or Bahrain and whether their reliance on the U.S. as a long-lasting security provider comes at odds with China's increasing role as a top client.
V. Conclusion
Please, let me know what do you think. Over the next few days, I am going to read couple of articles on this topic.
Jakub
(1) What will be the topic of the project? It does not suffice to limit our analysis to where China gets its oil from or what its future energy requirements will be.
- we should choose a specific aspect of this very broad topic so that we can better focus our research. Personally, I think there are two good ways we can approach it:
(a) Focus on China's oil policies towards a specific region (Africa, Middle East) and how this changes hitherto maintained balance of power there. Alternatively, what are the positive (greater development aid for the region..etc.) and negative (environmental degradation, propping up undemocratic governments..etc.) implications of China's growing involvement in that particular region.
(b) China's "oil expansion" into the Middle East and its potential consequences in terms of contending security concerns of other major powers there (the U.S. in particular). Can China's growing share on the Middle Eastern oil markets precipitate conflict? Is China speeding up the expansion of its maritime forces in order to better safeguard its oil imports (and, thereby, challenging the post-WWII U.S. hegemony in this area)?
- Let's talk about this. If anyone has a different view on how we should proceed, we can debate it.
(2) What is the outline and who's going to work on which part?
- obviously, without resolving the first point, there is no way of coming up with an outline. However, based on the blog posts made so far and our general interests, I propose the following:
TOPIC: CHINA OIL AFFAIRS: THE SHIFTING BALANCE OF POWER IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA
I. Introduction
II. China's Booming Economy: Past Precedents and Future Needs
(a) The Flawed Policy of Self-Reliance
(b) China's Economy Today: Growing Oil Demands, World Markets and Increased Foreign Involvement
III. The Security Framework in the Middle East
(a) The U.S. as a Traditional Provider of Security in the Middle East
(b) China's Increasing Share on the Persian Gulf Oil Market - A Threat to the U.S. Interests and Regional Security?
IV. The Security Framework in North Africa
(a) The Oil Markets in Sudan, Libya and Other Oil-Exporting Countries in the Region
(b) The Role of China: Oil Interests and the Changing Security Situation
V. Is China's Involvement in the Middle East and North Africa a Reason for Concern?
(a) How Is China's Economic Outreach Tied to a Greater Militarization of the Region? Or, Is It?
(b) U.S. Take on China's Increasingly Felt Presence in the Region
- in this paragraph, we could analyze countries like S. Arabia, Kuwait or Bahrain and whether their reliance on the U.S. as a long-lasting security provider comes at odds with China's increasing role as a top client.
V. Conclusion
Please, let me know what do you think. Over the next few days, I am going to read couple of articles on this topic.
Jakub
Sunday, April 17, 2011
China's Quest for The Next Empire
An article by Howard French in the Atlantic magazine (http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2010/05/the-next-empire/8018/) discusses how Chinese companies are signing deals that involve oil production in Africa. Since the turn of the millennium, Chinese companies have muscled in on lucrative oil markets in places like Angola, Nigeria, Algeria, and Sudan.
French claims that to fully grasp China’s economic approach in Africa, one must study European imperial history—as Beijing itself has been doing. "If you look at Chinese policy documents, it is very obvious that they are focused on opening up the heart of the continent. There is clearly a long-term strategy for doing this, and it seeks to break up the north-south flow of minerals, to build east-west lines that will allow them to bypass South Africa.”
French claims that to fully grasp China’s economic approach in Africa, one must study European imperial history—as Beijing itself has been doing. "If you look at Chinese policy documents, it is very obvious that they are focused on opening up the heart of the continent. There is clearly a long-term strategy for doing this, and it seeks to break up the north-south flow of minerals, to build east-west lines that will allow them to bypass South Africa.”
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